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Recognizing the Relevance of Human Rights:
The Application of the Presumption of Conformity
in the Context of Copyright
Graham Reynolds*
This article discusses the application of the presumption of
conformity with international law in the context of copyright.
Although Canadian courts have applied the presumption of
conformity in a number of copyright cases, no Canadian court has
explicitly considered, under the presumption of conformity, whether
interpretations of provisions of the Copyright Act are consistent with,
or reflect the values and principles of, international human rights
treaties that Canada has signed and ratified.
In this article, I will argue that Canadian courts applying the
presumption of conformity in the context of copyright should do so
with reference to Canada’s obligations under international human
rights treaties as well as its obligations under international
intellectual property rights agreements. Using fair dealing as my
illustrative example, I will offer some preliminary reflections on the
impact of applying the presumption of conformity in the context of
copyright with reference to Canada’s human rights obligations.
_________________________
Dans cet article, l’auteur traite de l’application de la pre´somption
de conformite´ au droit international dans le contexte du droit
d’auteur. Meˆme si les tribunaux canadiens ont applique´ la
pre´somption de conformite´ dans un certain nombre d’affaires en
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matie`re de droit d’auteur, aucun tribunal canadien n’a explicitement
examine´, dans le cadre de la pre´somption de conformite´, si les
interpre´tations des dispositions de la Loi sur le droit d’auteur
refle´taient les valeurs et les principes des traite´s internationaux
relatifs aux droits de la personne que le Canada a signe´s et ratifie´s, et
s’ils y e´taient conformes.
L’auteur soutient que les tribunaux canadiens qui appliquent la
pre´somption de conformite´ dans le contexte du droit d’auteur doivent
le faire en se re´fe´rant aux obligations du Canada en vertu des traite´s
internationaux relatifs aux droits de la personne ainsi qu’aux
obligations en vertu des accords internationaux relatifs aux droits
de proprie´te´ intellectuelle. En se servant de l’utilisation e´quitable a`
titre d’exemple, il offre quelques re´flexions pre´liminaires sur les
re´percussions de l’application de la pre´somption de conformite´ dans le
contexte du droit d’auteur en re´fe´rence aux obligations du Canada en
matie`re de droits de la personne.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the many contributions of David Vaver’s scholarship has
been to highlight the connections and tensions between copyright
and human rights.1 Critical of the idea of copyright as a form of
property, the sole purpose of which is to benefit copyright owners,2
Professor Vaver has advocated throughout the course of his career
for a copyright regime that balances between owners, users, and the
public more broadly,3 and that reflects human rights values and
1 See, for instance, David Vaver, ‘‘Copyright Defences as HumanRights” (2013)
J. C’right Soc’y of theUSA 661 at 671-72; David Vaver, ‘‘Intellectual Property:
The State of the Art” (2001) 32 V.U.W.L.R. 1 at 15.
2 See for instance, David Vaver, ‘‘Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and
Paradoxes” (1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 98 at 125-28.
3 See, for instance David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1997) at
146 and 171; David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law (Toronto: Irwin Law,
2011) at 14.
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principles including fairness,4 justice,5 responsibility,6 equality,7
and free speech.8
Building on Professor Vaver’s work in this area, this article will
discuss the application of the presumption of conformity — the
‘‘well-established principle of statutory interpretation that
legislation will be presumed to conform to international law”9 —
in the context of copyright. Canadian courts have applied the
presumption of conformity in a number of copyright cases.10 In
each of the decisions in which this presumption has been applied,
courts including the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) have done so
with reference to Canada’s obligations under international
intellectual property agreements.11 Despite growing awareness of
the many connections between copyright and human rights (as well
as between intellectual property and human rights more broadly),12
4 David Vaver, ‘‘Creating a Fair Intellectual Property System for the 21st
Century” (2001) 10 Otago L. Rev. 1.
5 David Vaver, ‘‘Reforming Intellectual Property Law: AnObvious and Not-so-
obvious Agenda” [2009] IPQ 143.
6 David Vaver, ‘‘Copyright and the Internet: From Owner Rights and User
Duties to User Rights and Owner Duties” (2007) 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 731.
7 David Vaver, ‘‘Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes”, supra
note 2.
8 David Vaver, ‘‘Intellectual Property: The State of the Art”, supra note 1 at 15.
9 R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26 at para. 53 [Hape].
10 See Part 3.a for discussion of this topic.
11 Canada has signed and ratified a number of international intellectual property
agreements, including Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (being Annex 1C of the Marrakesh
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3)
[TRIPS]; Revised Berne Convention, Schedule II of the Copyright Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. C30 [Berne Convention].
12 See, for instance: David Fewer, ‘‘Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of
Expression and theLimits of Copyright inCanada” (1997) 55U.T. Fac. L.Rev.
175; Peter Drahos, ‘‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights” (1999) 3 Intell.
Prop. Q. 349; Audrey Chapman, ‘‘The Human Rights Implication of
Intellectual Property Protection” (2002) 5 J. Intl. Econ. L. 861; Pamela
Samuelson, ‘‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective”
(2003) 10 J. Intell. Prop. L. 319; Ysolde Gendreau ‘‘Copyright and Freedom of
Expression in Canada”, in Paul L.C. Torremans, ed., Copyright and Human
Rights: Freedom of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy (New York:
Kluwer Law International, 2004); Jane Bailey, ‘‘Deflating the Michelin Man:
Protecting Users’ Rights in the Canadian Copyright Reform Process”, in
Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005); Jonathan
RECOGNIZING THE RELEVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 65
no Canadian court has explicitly considered, under the
Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen, eds., Copyright and Free Speech (Toronto:
OxfordUniversity Press, 2005);Margaret Chon, ‘‘Intellectual Property and the
Development Divide” (2006) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 2821 [Chon, ‘‘Development
Divide”]; CarysCraig, ‘‘Putting theCommunity inCommunication:Dissolving
the Conflict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56
U.T.L.J. 75; Paul L.C. Torremans, ‘‘Is Copyright a HumanRight” (2007) 2007
Mich. St. L. Rev. 271; Graeme W. Austin & Amy G. Zavidow, ‘‘Copyright
Reform through a Human Rights Lens” in Paul L.C. Torremans, ed.,
Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International 2008);
Daniel J. Gervais, “Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Learning to Live
Together” in Paul L.C. Torremans, ed., Intellectual Property andHumanRights
(Kluwer Law International, 2008); Paul L.C. Torremans, ‘‘Copyright (and
Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a Human Right” in Paul L.C. Torre-
mans, ed., Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Kluwer Law International
2008);WillemGrosheide, ed., Intellectual PropertyRights andHumanRights: A
Paradox (Edward Elgar, 2009); Mary W. S. Wong, ‘‘Toward an Alternative
Normative Framework for Copyright: From Private Property to Human
Rights” (2009) 26 Cardozo Arts. & Ent. L.J. 775; Lea Shaver & Caterina
Sganga, ‘‘The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and Human
Rights” (2010) 27:4 Wis. Intl. L.J. 637; Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme W.
Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Global Interface
(NewYork:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2011);DuncanMatthews, Intellectual
Property, Human Rights and Development: The Role of NGOs and Social
Movements (Edward Elgar, 2011); Peter K. Yu, ‘‘Intellectual property and
Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era,” 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1045; Christophe
Geiger, ed., Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property
(Edward Elgar, 2016). I have also published a number of works in this area,
including Graham Reynolds, ‘‘Reconsidering Copyright’s Constitutionality”
(2016) 53:3 O.H.L.J. 898; ‘‘The Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Towards
Explicit Engagement, by the Supreme Court of Canada, with theCharterRight
toFreedomofExpression in theContext ofCopyright” (2016) 41:2Queen’s L.J.
455; and ‘‘Moving Past Michelin: Towards Judicial Reconsideration of the
Intersection of Copyright and the Charter Right to Freedom of Expression”
(2017) 30 I.P.J. 25. In addition to scholarly writing on this topic, one can also
point to a recent decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia as
support for the argument that there is growing awareness of the relationship
between copyright and human rights. In Vancouver Aquarium Marine Science
Centre v. Charbonneau, 2017 BCCA 395 [Vancouver Aquarium], Bennett J.,
writing for the majority, stated that: ‘‘[w]hile the Copyright Act withstood a s.
2(b) constitutional challenge to its validity in Michelin v. Caw (1996), [1997] 2
F.C. 306, this does not mean that freedom of expression, as a Charter value,
should not be considered in an interlocutory injunction concerning copyright
issues. In my opinion, it may be highly relevant, depending on the circum-
stances” (Vancouver Aquarium, supra note 12 at para. 72). Ultimately, Bennett
J. determined that the interlocutory injunction was granted in error, in part
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presumption of conformity, whether interpretations of provisions
of the Copyright Act13 are consistent with, or reflect the values and
principles of, international human rights treaties that Canada has
signed and ratified.14
The lack of attention paid to this issue is problematic. As noted
by LeBel J. in his majority judgment in in R. v. Hape:
The presumption of conformity is based on the rule of judicial
policy that, as a matter of law, courts will strive to avoid
constructions of domestic law pursuant to which the state would
be in violation of its international obligations, unless the
wording of the statute clearly compels that result.15
Failure to properly consider Canada’s human rights obligations
when interpreting provisions of the Copyright Act could thus result
in Canada being in violation of its obligations under international
human rights treaties, ‘‘risk[ing] incursion by the courts in the
because the film — despite containing material that allegedly infringed
copyright — ‘‘is part of a public dialogue and debate on the issue of whether
cetaceans should be kept in captivity, and thus, the Charter value of freedom of
expression must weigh against granting the injunctive relief” (Vancouver
Aquarium, supra note 12 at para. 82).
13 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42.
14 Human rights agreements that Canada has signed and ratified include the
International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, 999U.N.T.S. 171 [ICCPR];
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [ICESCR]; Other human rights agreements that Canada has signed
and ratified include the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, Can. T.S. 1970 No. 28, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Can. T.S.1982 No.
31, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1465U.N.T.S. 85, theConvention on the Rights of the
Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 [CRPD]. Canada has also adopted and given its
full support to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007)
[UNDRIP]. As highlighted by an anonymous reviewer, UNDRIP may be
particularly relevant in considering future policy reforms in the area of
copyright. Consider, for instance, art. 11(2) of UNDRIP, which provides that
‘‘States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to
their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their
free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and
customs.”
15 Hape, supra note 9 at para. 53.
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executive’s conduct of foreign affairs and censure under
international law.”16
In this article, I argue that Canadian courts applying the
presumption of conformity in the context of copyright should do so
with reference to Canada’s obligations under international human
rights treaties as well as its obligations under international
intellectual property rights agreements. This article proceeds as
follows. In Part 2, I introduce the presumption of conformity. In
Part 3, I argue that Canada’s obligations under international
human rights treaties are relevant obligations for the purpose of
applying the presumption of conformity in the context of copyright.
In Part 4, using fair dealing as my illustrative example, I offer some
preliminary reflections on the impact of applying the presumption
of conformity in the context of copyright with reference to
Canada’s human rights obligations. Part 5 concludes the article.
2. THE PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
John Currie writes that while Canada is bound internationally
by international treaties that it has signed and ratified, these treaties
‘‘have no formal, direct legal effect of their own within the
Canadian legal system.”17 However, although international treaties
are not ‘‘binding on Canadian legislatures,” as noted by Ruth
Sullivan, ‘‘domestic legislation is presumed to comply with
international law.”18 This presumption is referred to as the
presumption of conformity with international law (or the
presumption of conformity).
Citing to the work of Professor Sullivan, LeBel J., in his
majority decision in R. v. Hape, described the presumption of
conformity as follows:
R. Sullivan, Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of
Statutes (4th ed. 2002), at p. 422, explains that the presumption
16 B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 at para. 47 [B010].
17 John Currie, Public International Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at
235.
18 Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) at
311 and 314. InB010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),McLachlinC.J.,
who delivered the judgment for the court, noted that ‘‘[t]his interpretive
presumption is not peculiar to Canada. It is a feature of legal interpretation
around the world” (B010, supra note 16 at para. 48).
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has two aspects. First, the legislature is presumed to act in
compliance with Canada’s obligations as a signatory of inter-
national treaties and as a member of the international commu-
nity. In deciding between possible interpretations, courts will
avoid a construction that would place Canada in breach of
those obligations. The second aspect is that the legislature is
presumed to comply with the values and principles of customary
and conventional international law. Those values and principles
form part of the context in which statutes are enacted, and
courts will therefore prefer a construction that reflects them.
The presumption is rebuttable, however. Parliamentary sover-
eignty requires courts to give effect to a statute that demon-
strates an unequivocal legislative intent to default on an
international obligation.19
Professor Currie writes that ‘‘Canadian courts historically
refused to give any effect at all to unimplemented treaties.”20
However, as Professor Sullivan notes, ‘‘it is now common to invoke
[international law] as an aid in interpreting domestic legislation.”21
As described below, copyright is one area in which the presumption
of conformity has been regularly applied by Canadian courts,
including the SCC.
19 Hape, supra note 9 at para. 53. LeBel J.’s discussion of the presumption of
conformity in R. v. Hape has been cited to with authority in a number of
subsequent SCC decisions, includingUnited States of America v. Anekwu, 2009
SCC 41 at para. 25; Ne´meth v. Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56 at para. 34;
MerckFrosst CanadaLtd. v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC3at para. 117;Kazemi
Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62 at para. 60; B010, supra note 16
at para. 47; and R. v. Appulonappa, 2015 SCC 59 at para. 40. Other SCC
decisions in which this principle has been applied include Zingre v. The Queen,
[1981] 2 S.C.R. 392 at 409-10; National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import
Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 at 1371; Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R.
437 at para. 137; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para. 70; and Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General),
2002 SCC 62 at para. 50; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law
v.Canada (AttorneyGeneral), 2004 SCC4;GreConDimter inc. v. J.R.Normand
inc., 2005 SCC 46 at para. 39; and Thibodeau v. Air Canada, 2014 SCC 67 at
para. 113;M.M. v. United States of America, 2015 SCC 62 at para. 257.
20 Currie, supra note 17 at 246.
21 Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 567).
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3. THE APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONFORMITY IN THE CONTEXT OF COPYRIGHT
(a) Canadian Courts’ Application of the Presumption of
Conformity in the Context of Copyright
Canadian courts have applied the presumption of conformity in
a number of copyright decisions. The SCC, in particular, has relied
extensively on this principle of statutory interpretation. For
instance, in CCH Canadian et al v. Law Society of Canada,
McLachlin C.J., in her judgment for the court, noted that her
interpretation of the Copyright Act’s originality requirement is
consistent with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (1886).22 Similarly, in Society of Composers,
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers (SOCAN v. CAIP), Binnie J., in his majority
decision, wrote that his interpretation of s. 2(4)(1)(b) of the
Copyright Act is ‘‘consistent with art. 8 of the [World Intellectual
Property Organization] Copyright Treaty” (WCT).23 In the same
decision, LeBel J., in his dissenting reasons, wrote that his
interpretation of s. 3(1)(f) of the Copyright Act was consistent
with both the Berne Convention and the WCT.24 In Rogers
Communications Inc. v. SOCAN, Rothstein J., in his majority
judgment, also noted that the approach that he adopted to s. 3(1)(f)
of the Copyright Act is consistent with the WCT.25 As well, in
Re:Sound v. Motion Picture Theatre Association, LeBel J., in his
judgment for the court, wrote that:
As this Court noted in National Corn Growers Assn. v.
Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324: ‘‘. . . where
the text of the domestic law lends itself to it, one should also
strive to expound an interpretation which is consonant with
the relevant international obligations” (p. 1371). In the case
22 CCH Canadian et al v. Law Society of Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at para. 19 [CCH
Canadian et al]
23 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian
Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at para. 97 [SOCAN v. CAIP].
24 Ibid., at para. 151.
25 Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35 at paras. 44-49 [Rogers]. At the time that the
SCC heard arguments in both Rogers and SOCAN v. CAIP, Canada had
neither ratified nor implemented the WCT (Rogers, ibid. at para. 49).
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at bar, the Board’s interpretation [of the definition of ‘sound
recording’ under s. 2 of the Copyright Act] is consonant with
Canada’s obligations under the Rome Convention.26
While the SCC has frequently applied the presumption of
conformity in the context of copyright, as noted above, it has
limited its application of this presumption to a subset of
international law, namely international intellectual property
agreements. In the next section, I argue that Canada’s obligations
under international human rights treaties are also relevant
obligations for Canadian courts to consider when applying the
presumption of conformity in the context of copyright.
(b) Canada’s Obligations under International Human Rights
Treaties are Relevant Obligations
The many connections between copyright and human rights
justify the treatment of Canada’s obligations under international
human rights treaties as relevant obligations when applying the
presumption of conformity in the context of copyright. One of the
mechanisms through which states provide protection for the right
of everyone ‘‘[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which [they are] the author,” as guaranteed under
art. 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),27 copyright both promotes and limits
the ability of individuals and groups to exercise rights guaranteed
to them under international human rights treaties.
For instance, copyright both supports and limits the right to
freedom of expression, as guaranteed under international human
rights treaties including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).28 By providing authors with marketable
rights in works that they create and from which they can gain
income, copyright supports the freedom of expression interests of
authors.29 As well, to the extent that copyright acts as an incentive
26 Re:Sound v. Motion Picture Theatre Associations of Canada, 2012 SCC 38 at
para. 51.
27 ICESCR, supra note 14 at art. 15(1)(c).
28 ICCPR, supra note 14 at art. 19.
29 See, for instance Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (Don Mills:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
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for the creation and dissemination of expression (a question that
has been the subject of vigorous debate30), it also advances the
freedom of expression interests of non-copyright owning parties. It
does so by increasing the supply of works that can then be used by
non-copyright owning parties in certain circumstances during the
period of copyright protection, and without restraint after the
copyright has expired.
At the same time, however, copyright limits the ability of
individuals and groups to exercise their right to freedom of
expression. In order to avoid infringing copyright, parties wishing
to convey meaning using a substantial amount of another’s
copyrighted expression — including by incorporating this
expression into their own works or by making this expression
available to a wider audience — must pay to secure a license,
receive permission from the copyright owner, or ensure that their
actions fall within one of the defences to copyright infringement set
out in the Copyright Act. If they are not able to do so, their
unauthorized use infringes copyright. A range of penalties are
attached to actions that infringe copyright, ranging from financial
penalties to criminal sanctions.31
Similarly, copyright both supports and limits the ‘‘right to
participate in cultural life” as guaranteed under art. 15(1)(a) of the
ICESCR.32 By providing income to authors, copyright helps to
create the conditions through which authors can participate in
society. At the same time, copyright also limits the ability of
30 The question of whether and the extent to which copyright acts as an incentive
for the creation and dissemination of expression has been the subject of
significant scholarly attention. See, for instance: David Vaver, ‘‘Intellectual
Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes”, supra note 7; Raymond Shih Ray
Ku et al., ‘‘Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of
Copyright’s Bounty” (2009) 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1669; Shyamkrishna Balganesh,
‘‘Forseeability and Copyright Incentives” (2009) 122 Harv. L. Rev 1569; Julie
E. Cohen, ‘‘Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: AResearch
Agenda” (2011) 2011 Wisc. L. Rev. 141; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘‘The
Normative Structure of Copyright Law”, in Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed.,
Intellectual Property and the Common Law (CambridgeUniversity Press: 2013).
31 See Part IV of the Copyright Act, supra note 13.
32 ICESCR, supra note 14 at art. 15(1)(a).
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individuals and groups to participate in cultural life by restricting
their ability to access and use copyrighted works without
authorization.33
As well, by giving authors who retain copyright in works that
they create a degree of control over whether and how their work is
presented, copyright provides a degree of protection for authors’
privacy rights, as well as a degree of protection against ‘‘unlawful
attack[s] on their honour and reputation.”34 At the same time,
however, attempts to enforce rights in copyrighted expression
through tracking or monitoring of online behaviour, as well as
through digital rights management technologies, may infringe the
right of individuals to protection against arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy.35
The description of the relationship between copyright and
human rights, as set out above, is by no means exhaustive.36
33 Article 30(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, whichCanada has signed and ratified, provides that ‘‘States Parties
shall take all appropriate steps, in accordance with international law, to ensure
that laws protecting intellectual property rights do not constitute an unreason-
able or discriminatory barrier to access by persons with disabilities to cultural
materials” (CRPD, supra note 14 at art. 30(3)). It is conceivable that Canadian
courts could adopt interpretations of provisions of theCopyright Act that result
in ‘‘unreasonable or discriminatory barrier[s] to access by persons with
disabilities to cultural materials” (CRPD, supra note 14 at art. 30(3)), placing
Canada in breach of its obligation under the CRPD. My thanks to Ariel Katz
for bringing this article to my attention.
34 ICCPR, supra note 14 at art. 17; ICESCR, supra note 14 at art. 15(1)(c).
35 ICCPR, supranote 14 at art. 17. See, for instance, IanKerr,AlanaMaurushat&
Christian Tacit, ‘‘Technical Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s
Windmill” (2002-2003) 34 Ottawa L. Rev. 6; Julie E. Cohen, ‘‘DRM and
Privacy” (2003) 18 B.T.L.J. 575; Sonia K. Katyal, ‘‘Privacy vs. Piracy” (2005)
Yale J.L. & Tech. 222; and Bill D. Herman, ‘‘A Political History of DRM and
Related Copyright Debates, 1987-2012” (2012) 14 Yale J.L. & Tech. 162.
36 Among other topics that could be canvassed, one could discuss the ways in
which Canada’s copyright regime advances core human rights values including
justice, fairness, equality, discrimination, dignity, and accessibility. Bassem
Awad, for instance, argues that recent amendments to the Copyright Act
designed to implement the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Publish
Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print
Disabled have helped to make Canada’s copyright regime more inclusive
(Bassem Awad, ‘‘How the Marrakesh Treaty makes the Intellectual Property
system more inclusive”, OpenCanada.org (September 29, 2016), available
online at https://www.opencanada.org/features/how-marrakesh-treaty-
makes-intellectual-property-system-more-inclusive/). At the same time, other
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Nevertheless, by highlighting some of ways in which copyright and
human rights are interconnected, it provides support for the
conclusion that depending on the provision of the Copyright Act
being construed, Canada’s obligations under international human
rights treaties are relevant obligations for the purposes of applying
the presumption of conformity.
Two consequences, in particular, should result from this
conclusion. First, in determining how to construe provisions of
the Copyright Act, courts must ‘‘avoid a construction that would
place Canada in breach of [its] obligations” under international
human rights treaties.37 Second, when interpreting provisions of the
Copyright Act, Canadian courts should prefer a construction that
— to the extent possible — reflects the values and principles
embodied in international human rights treaties as well as other
relevant values and principles.38
scholars have highlighted themanyways inwhich copyright regimes have failed
to adequately protect human rights values, including by creating and
perpetuating inequalities. See, for instance: Kevin J Greene, ‘‘Copyright,
Culture & (and) Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection” (1999) 21
Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 339; Olufunmailayo B. Arewa, ‘‘TRIPS and
Traditional Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global
Intellectual Property Frameworks” (2006) 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 155;
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, ‘‘From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing,
Copyright and Cultural Context” (2006) 84 N.C. L. Rev. 547; Chon,
‘‘Development Divide”, supra note 12; Keith Aoki, ‘‘Distributive and Syncretic
Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion,
Agency, and Development)” (2007) 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 717; Anupam
Chander &Madhavi Sunder, ‘‘Is NozickKicking Rawls’s Ass?” (2007) 40U.C.
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Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 365; Lateef Matima, ‘‘Copyright Social Utility and
Social Justice Interdependence” (2009) 112 W. Va. L. Rev. 97; Olufunmailayo
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38 Hape, supra note 9 at para. 53. This article will focus on Canada’s obligations
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4. APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION OF CONFORMITY IN
THE CONTEXT OF FAIR DEALING: PRELIMINARY
REFLECTIONS
In the following section, I discuss the potential force and
significance of applying the presumption of conformity in the
context of copyright with reference to Canada’s obligations under
international human rights treaties.39 I do so using fair dealing as
my illustrative example. A user right that is linked to many human
rights including the right to freedom of expression, the right to
participate in cultural life, and privacy rights, fair dealing is
provided for under ss. 29-29.2 of the Copyright Act. Section 29
provides that ‘‘[f]air dealing for the purpose of research, private
study, education, parody or satire does not infringe copyright,”
while ss. 29.1 and 29.2 provide that fair dealing for the purpose of
criticism (s. 29.1), review (s. 29.1) and news reporting (s. 29.2) do
not infringe copyright if certain attribution requirements are
satisfied.40 Neither the fair dealing categories nor ‘‘fair dealing”
itself is defined in the Copyright Act.
The prevailing approach to fair dealing in Canada was set out
by McLachlin C.J. in her decision for the court in CCH Canadian
Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada.41 In her decision, McLachlin
C.J. clarified that the fair dealing analysis proceeds in either two or
three steps, depending on the category of dealing in question.42
First, the defendant must establish that the dealing falls within one
of the eight fair dealing categories listed above. Second, the
defendant must establish that the dealing is ‘‘fair.”43 In the event
that the defendant wishes to argue fair dealing for the purpose of
under international human rights treaties. The potential impact of Canada’s
human rights obligations under customary law on copyright will be addressed
in a separate work.
39 While a fulsome analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of this article to
address, I will suggest several consequences that could result that will be
addressed in further detail in a separate work.
40 Copyright Act, supra note 13 at ss. 29-29.2.
41 CCHCanadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, supra note 22 at paras. 48-
60.
42 Ibid. at para. 50.
43 In the context of discussing this second step, McLachlin C.J. outlined out a
number of factors that can be used by courts to determine whether a dealing is
fair, namely the purpose of the dealing, the character of the dealing, the amount
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criticism, review or news reporting, they must also satisfy the
attribution requirements outlined in ss. 29.1 or 29.2 of the
Copyright Act.
In addition to setting out the correct approach to fair dealing,
McLachlin C.J. — citing to the work of Professor Vaver — also
discussed the nature of fair dealing, writing that ‘‘[t]he fair dealing
exception, like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s
right. In order to maintain the proper balance between the rights of
a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted
restrictively.”44
The SCC affirmed the nature of fair dealing as a user right in
several copyright decisions handed down in 2012.45 In these
decisions, the SCC also provided additional clarity with respect
to both the nature of users’ rights as well as certain aspects of fair
dealing as a user right. In SOCAN v. Bell, for instance, Abella J.,
who delivered the judgment of the court, wrote that ‘‘users’ rights
are an essential part of furthering the public interest objectives of
the Copyright Act;” that fair dealing is ‘‘[o]ne of the tools employed
to achieve the proper balance between protection and access in the
Act;” and that ‘‘[i]n order to maintain the proper balance between
these interests, the fair dealing provision ‘must not be interpreted
restrictively’.”46
Several scholars have noted how the SCC’s approach to fair
dealing advances and supports internationally-guaranteed human
rights including the right to freedom of expression.47 Professor
Vaver, for instance, highlights how language used by Abella J. in
her decision for the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in SOCAN v.
Bell tracks closely to the language of international human rights
of dealing, alternatives to the dealing, the nature of the work, and the effect of
the dealing on the work (ibid. at para. 53).
44 Ibid. at para. 48.
45 Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copy-
right), 2012 SCC 37 at para. 22; Society of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Canada v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 at para. 29 [SOCAN v. Bell].
46 SOCAN v. Bell, ibid. note 45 at para. 11.
47 See, for instance, Vaver, ‘‘Copyright Defences as User Rights”, supra note 1;
Jane Bailey, ‘‘Deflating the Michelin Man” in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public
Interest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005); Graham Reynolds, ‘‘The Limits of
Statutory Interpretation: Towards Explicit Engagement, by the SupremeCourt
of Canada, with the Charter Right to Freedom of Expression in the Context of
Copyright” (2016) 41 Queen’s L.J. 455.
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treaties. Specifically, he notes that ‘‘[w]hen the Supreme Court
speaks of copyright law’s need to achieve a ‘proper balance between
protection and access,’ the language echoes the customary
international law of human rights treaties such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.”48
Nevertheless, even if the SCC’s approach to fair dealing is
already broadly aligned with Canada’s human rights obligations,
several additional consequences might result from treating
international human rights treaties as relevant instruments for the
purpose of applying the presumption of conformity in the context
of fair dealing. First, doing so would provide additional support for
a number of aspects of the SCC’s current approach to fair dealing.
Courts could state, for instance, that the SCC’s articulation of fair
dealing as a user right is consistent with Canada’s human rights
obligations, in that this conception of and approach to fair dealing
preserves space within copyright for individuals and groups to
exercise the rights guaranteed to them under international human
rights treaties that Canada has ratified including the ICCPR and
the ICESCR.
Second, treating Canada’s obligations under international
human rights treaties as relevant obligations for the purpose of
applying the presumption of conformity in the context of copyright
would help guard against the possibility that future courts
interpreting provisions of the Copyright Act will inappropriately
restrict the scope of fair dealing by giving undue weight to Canada’s
obligations under international intellectual property agreements.
One decision that can be critiqued on these grounds is Collective
Administration in relation to rights under sections 3, 15, 18 and 21
(Re), [2009] C.B.D. No. 6 (Collective Administration). One of the
issues dealt with in this Copyright Board of Canada decision was
whether the photocopying of short excerpts of works by teachers at
their own initiative for their students constituted fair dealing.
Despite not being able to quantify the ‘‘impact of photocopies
made in support of these practices,” the Copyright Board
concluded, in the context of considering the effect of the dealing
on the work factor as part of the fairness analysis, that this impact
is ‘‘sufficiently important to compete with the original to make the
dealing unfair.”49
48 Vaver, ‘‘Copyright Defences as User Rights”, supra note 1 at 671-72.
49 Collective Administration in relation to rights under sections 3, 15, 18 and 21 (Re)
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The Copyright Board also wrote that ‘‘even if it were possible to
show that each downstream dealing by a student is research-based
and fair, the upstream dealings of teachers making copies for their
entire class would not be,” and that ‘‘even when regarded as
facilitation, a systemic practice that competes with the market of
the original must not be permitted, regardless of whether
downstream dealings fall under the fair dealing exception.”50
In support of these statements, the Copyright Board made
reference to three-step test, described by Daniel Gervais as ‘‘the
cornerstone for almost all exceptions to all intellectual property
rights at the international level.”51 Originally set out in art. 9(2) of
the Berne Convention, a modified version of this test was later
incorporated into TRIPS as art. 13, which reads: ‘‘[m]embers shall
confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain
special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the right holder.”52
Considering the fairness analysis in light of both art. 13 of
TRIPS and art. 9(2) of the Berne Convention, the Copyright Board
wrote in Collective Administration in relation to rights under sections
3, 15, 18 and 21 (Re) that their approach, as described above:
[S]eems to be the only one that conforms with article 9(2) of the
[Berne Convention] and article 13 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights concluded within
the framework of the World Trade Organization. It is not
necessary to make an exhaustive analysis of these provisions.
That said, it seems self-evident that copies made on a teacher’s
initiative for his or her students either conflict with the normal
exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legit-
imate interests of the rights holders. Lately, the Supreme Court
has been placing significant emphasis on treaties that Canada
has not yet ratified [(the WCT)]; it seems even more crucial to
account for those that have been.53
(July 17, 2009), Majeau, [2009] C.B.D. No. 6 at para. 111 [Collective
Administration].
50 Collective Administration, ibid. at paras. 112-113.
51 Daniel Gervais, ‘‘Towards a New Core International Copyright Norm: The
Reverse Three-Step Test” (2005) 9 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1 at 13.
52 TRIPS, supra note 11 at art. 13; Berne Convention, supra note 11 at art. 9(2).
53 Collective Administration, supra note 49 at para. 114.
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On appeal (as Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright
Licensing Agency (Access Copyright)), Abella J., in her majority
judgment, determined that the Copyright Board misapplied a
number of the fairness factors, and as a result that ‘‘its outcome was
. . . unreasonable.”54 Neither Abella J. in her majority judgment nor
Rothstein J. in his dissenting judgment cited to the passage in the
Copyright Board’s decision that referenced the three-step test.
Abella J., however, was highly critical of the Copyright Board’s
approach to the effect of the dealing factor.55
Reference to Canada’s obligations under international human
rights agreements, as well as human rights values, could have
provided additional support for Abella J.’s conclusion. For
instance, it could be argued that the Copyright Board’s approach
to the effect of the dealing factor in Collective Administration in
relation to rights under sections 3, 15, 18 and 21 (Re), by
significantly narrowing the scope of the fair dealing defence and
limiting its availability in the educational context, fails to
adequately reflect the values and principles of international
human rights treaties that Canada has signed and ratified,
including but not limited to the values of accessibility,56 non-
discrimination, equality, and freedom of expression.
It could also be argued that the Copyright Board’s approach to
the effect of the dealing factor is inconsistent with Canada’s
obligations under human rights instruments including the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.57 For instance, Abella J.’s
conclusion that the Copyright Board’s outcome was unreasonable
could be supported by reference to art. 3 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, under which ‘‘the best interests of the child shall
54 Alberta (Education), supra note 45 at para. 37.
55 See Alberta (Education), supra note 45 at paras. 33-36. Among other
statements, Abella J. writes that ‘‘[i]n addition, it is difficult to see how the
teachers’ copying competes with the market for textbooks, given the Board’s
finding that the teachers’ copying was limited to short excerpts of complemen-
tary texts” (Alberta (Education), supra note 45 at para. 36).
56 See, for instance, Yannis Vardakastanis, ‘‘Opinion of the European Economic
and Social Committee on ‘Accessibility as a human right for persons with
disabilities’”, TEN/515-EESC-2013, January 21, 2014 on the electronic
publication of the Official Journal of the European Union, 2014 O.J. (C 177)
15, available online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?ur-
i=uriserv:OJ.C_.2014.177.01.0015.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2014:177:FULL.
57 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, supra note 14.
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be a primary consideration.”58 It could be argued that the
Copyright Board’s approach to the effect of the dealing factor
fails to give due regard to the best interests of the child by severely
limiting the ability of children to access educational materials
without first paying a licensing fee. One consequence of this
approach is that absent additional intervention, students from
schools with fewer financial resources would have access to a more
limited range of educational materials than schools with greater
financial resources. This is arguably inconsistent with art. 28 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, under which ‘‘State Parties
recognize the right of the child to education . . . on the basis of equal
opportunity” (emphasis added).59
This is not to suggest that Canada’s obligations under
international intellectual property agreements are not relevant
obligations for courts to consider when applying the presumption
of conformity in the context of copyright. Both sets of obligations
may be relevant, depending on the provision in question.
Furthermore, depending on the context, these obligations may
appear to conflict or be in tension with each other. However, as
McLachlin C.J. writes in her judgment for the court in R. v.
Appulonappa, ‘‘the way forward lies in an interpretation which
harmonizes obligations in the international instruments to which
Canada is a party in a way that avoids conflict and gives expression
to each of the various commitments.”60
Third, treating Canada’s human rights obligations as relevant
obligations in applying the presumption of conformity in the
context of copyright could also support further modifications to the
fair dealing analysis as applied by Canadian courts. For instance,
existing fairness factors may be applied differently in light of
Canada’s human rights obligations. In applying the purpose of the
dealing factor, a court could consider whether the goal of the
dealing supports or advances human rights values.61 As well,
58 Ibid. art. 3.
59 Ibid. art. 28.
60 R. v. Appulonappa, 2015 SCC 59 at para. 45. McLachlin C.J. wrote this
statement in the context of ‘‘conflicting statements of the legislative objects of a
statute” (ibid. at para. 45).
61 Take, for instance, the example of an amateur archivist making unauthorized
copies of copyright-protected works. In addition to describing the goal of this
dealing as to enable themselves and others to continue to engage in research,
private study, review, and/or criticism of this work, the court could also
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applying the fairness analysis in light of Canada’s human rights
obligations could also lead to the development of new fairness
factors that focus more squarely on the effect of the dealing on
human rights values and principles, including the impact that a
finding of infringement may have on inequality, justice, or
accessibility.62
5. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that Canada’s obligations under
human rights treaties are relevant international obligations for the
purposes of applying the presumption of conformity in the context
of copyright. As such, Canadian courts tasked with interpreting
provisions of the Copyright Act must ‘‘avoid a construction that
would place Canada in breach of [its] obligations” under
international human rights treaties.63 As well, Canadian courts,
to the extent possible, should prefer interpretations of the Copyright
Act that reflect the values and principles embodied in international
human rights treaties over those that do not reflect these values and
principles.64
Using fair dealing as my illustrative example, I provided some
preliminary reflections on several implications that could result
from treating Canada’s human rights obligations as relevant
obligations for the purposes of applying the presumption of
conformity in the context of copyright. It is my argument that
doing so could provide additional support for a number of aspects
of the SCC’s current approach to fair dealing; help guard against
courts adopting interpretations of provisions of the Copyright Act
that give undue weight to Canada’s obligations under international
intellectual property agreements at the expense of Canada’s human
rights obligations; and support further modifications to Canada’s
fair dealing defence that would reflect human rights values and
highlight the connection between preservation and the human rights value of
accessibility.
62 AsMcLachlin C.J. noted inCCHCanadian et al, ‘‘[i]n some contexts, theremay
be factors other than those listed here that may help a court decide whether the
dealing was fair” (supra note 22 at para. 60).
63 Hape, supra note 9 at para. 53.
64 Ibid.
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principles, including through the articulation of new fairness
factors.
Treating Canada’s obligations under international human rights
treaties as relevant obligations for the purpose of applying the
presumption of conformity would serve as an acknowledgment of
the many connections between copyright and human rights —
connections that Professor Vaver has emphasized throughout the
course of his career. Doing so would also help to construct a
copyright regime that while remaining consistent with Canada’s
obligations under international intellectual property agreements,
also reflects and embodies Canada’s human rights obligations as
well as human rights values.
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